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ASK ME NO QUESTIONS, I'LL TELL YOU NO LIES: DOES THE BRADLEY EFFECT STILL EXIST?

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Abstract: Since African-Americans began competing in elections in majority white districts, researchers have postulated that some whites were reticent to tell pollsters that they intended to vote for the white candidate, causing polling to be inaccurate. Prior to 2006, it was difficult to determine empirically whether the Bradley Effect existed, and if it did, how powerful of a factor it was, since there were relatively few cases to examine. This study examines the 2006 electoral contests that pitted African-Americans versus whites, and analyzes the Democratic primaries and caucuses in the 2008 presidential race. We find that a Bradley Effect did exist in about half of the 2006 elections and in about one quarter of the 2008 primaries. However, a 'reverse' Bradley Effect occurred about as often.

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In the 1982 California gubernatorial election, the mayor of Los Angeles, Thomas Bradley, held a compelling lead in polling through election day, but was defeated by 100,000 votes to George Deukmejian, a white conservative Republican. Thus was borne the term 'Bradley Effect' (Citrin, Green, & Sears, 1990), an expression based upon the premise that some white voters indicates to pollsters a preference for the candidate of color or indicate that they are undecided. Ultimately, however, they pull the lever for the white candidate once they are in the privacy of the voting booth. In subsequent campaigns, election results have indicated the 1982 Bradley Effect was not an isolated incident. Two of the more notable elections in which the "Bradley Effect" has been acknowledged are the 1989 Virginia gubernatorial election and the 1992 Illinois Senate election.

In order for an election to be characterized as influenced by the Bradley Effect, two critical conditions must be met. First, the election must pit a white candidate against an African-American. Second, there must be a perception that the election is competitive so polling is conducted prior to Election Day. In a typical election year, very few contests meet both of these criteria. However, the 2006 election cycle changed this trend by presenting seven competitive statewide elections with African-American candidates challenging white candidates in competitive elections. We will examine each of these races to determine which, if any, presented a Bradley Effect scenario.

We then turn our attention to the contest for the 2008 Presidential Democratic Party Nomination, which includes an African American candidate, Barack Obama. This unique and extended competition provides several opportunities to examine the extent in which the Bradley Effect continues in contemporary American politics. Barack Obama has faced a series of elections against white opponent(s) and polling has been conducted in many of these contests. Thus, we are able to determine if, and where, the Bradley Effect continues.

As well as examining the extent to which the Bradley Effect continues, this research subdivides the Presidential nominating contests in a number of ways. First, we examine (if a Bradley Effect does exist) whether it is more prone to occur in caucus states or in primary states. We then analyze the Democratic Presidential nomination contests on a number of factors including:

- Geography, i.e., the different regions of the nation.
- Race, i.e., African-American and Hispanic percentage in each state.
- Age, i.e., percentage of elderly voters in each state.
- Urbanization, i.e., the percentage of voters residing in urban areas in each state.

We plan to compare polling results (as tabulated by Real Clear Politics) with the final vote percentages received by Barack Obama for each of the above factors. The results of our analysis will provide a direct examination of whether there has been a reduction in the Bradley Effect or whether it continues into the 21st century.

INTRODUCTION

In 1982, the California gubernatorial contest pitted Democrat Thomas Bradley, the African-American mayor of Los Angeles, against George Deukmejian, a white Republican, and the state Attorney General. Polls prior to Election Day showed Bradley a sizable lead; however, on Election Day the voters chose Deukmejian. Thus was borne the term 'Bradley Effect', which indicates that, for a subset of white voters, there is a reticence to indicate to pollsters that they oppose the African-American candidate although they have no intention of casting their ballot for him (or her). It should be understood at the start that the Bradley effect is slightly different from an unwillingness of white voters to reject an African-American candidate solely based on race. If a white voter plans to vote for a white candidate instead of an African-American primarily because of race, and accurately relates this choice to pollsters, this would not be characterized as the Bradley effect. The Bradley effect, instead, deals with a problem that is important to election polling, i.e., white voters telling pollsters of a position that lacks veracity. Now, this may seem a mundane topic, unless we examine how electioneering has been conducted in the United States during recent years. For example, candidates make spending decisions in markets where additional advertising or campaign appearances will make the difference between winning and losing, or at least will induce their opponent expend resources to maintain their lead. If polling is unreliable, resource allocation becomes more problematic. The Bradley Effect also is important because it provides evidence that there may be an insidious racial problem in our nation. Unlike individuals who are unashamed of their racist views, there is another group who is aware their views are socially unacceptable and attempt to hide behind a veneer of toleration (Parks & Rachlinski, 2008).

This study will serve a number of purposes that will aid in an understanding of the Bradley effect. We will begin by examining in some detail electoral races where the Bradley effect has taken place in the last quarter century. We then examine each of the relevant races in 2006, which provided an ideal opportunity to observe whether the Bradley effect had continued unabated. The remainder of the paper is devoted to an in-depth examination of the contest for the 2008 Democratic Presidential Party nomination.

THE BRADLEY EFFECT

There have been many African-Americans elected to the House of Representatives in the last thirty years. However, most have won in districts populated by a majority of African-American voters (Canon, 1999). When African-Americans opt to run for elective office at either a state or a national level, obviously, they do not have a racial congruity with the majority of constituents. For them to be victorious in these areas requires them to seek the support of white voters. This is a much more tenuous proposition for a variety of reasons (Highton, 2004).

There is a strong belief among many that white voters are very reluctant to vote for African-American candidates because of racial polarization (Lublin, 1997). This belief is central to the establishment of majority-minority districts since otherwise, it is thought, there would be few if any African-Americans serving in elective offices (Highton, 2004). The primary rationale explained for this behavior is that white voters are prejudiced and their racial aversion to non-white candidates makes it very difficult for the election of minority candidates in multi-racial districts dominated by white constituents. Researchers have shown there is reluctance for many white voters to support minority candidates. In fact, studies have shown white support for African-American candidates is about 10% less than for white candidates from the same party (Bullock & Dunn, 1999; Gay, 1999).

We posit that much of the Bradley Effect may be determined by examining how voters which pollsters place as 'undecided' actually act in the confines of the voting booth. If there were no Bradley Effect, we would expect these undecided voters to cast their ballots in similar numbers to those who have previously made their vote choice clear. Any substantial difference from this, we claim, is potentially a Bradley Effect scenario.

Gopoian and Hadjiharalambous (1994) study in detail the issue of the difference between late deciding voters and those who made their preference weeks before they cast their ballot. They note that based upon sixteen years of voting data, contrary to the dominant theme of the prevailing literature (Campbell et al, 1960), late deciders are not more cross-pressured by opposing goals than are other voters. However, they found these voters are less involved with the political system or have less attachment to candidates. That is, they tend to have less faith that the political system will impact them, that is, which candidates are chosen actually matters in their own lives, and therefore, care little about the outcome of the election. However, important for this research, ordinarily late deciders do not make a vote choice that is much different from others.

However, when we stir race into the mix, what effect does it have? Whites over the years have shown a noticeable decline in responding negatively to racially sensitive issues (Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1985) in public opinion

surveys. Perhaps, though, it is that whites are sophisticated enough to know views linked to racism are inappropriate, and, therefore, should remain hidden from public view. This viewpoint, that the norms have changed and not the voters (Hagen, 1995), supports our hypothesis that undecided voters form the crux of the Bradley Effect. The Bradley Effect concerned not just pollsters but also alarmed political strategists who, throughout the 1990's, were convinced that an African-American candidate who did not have a majority in pre-election polling without any undecided voters was likely to lose (Moskowitz & Stroh, 1994).

Thomas Bradley was first elected in 1973 to the office of Los Angeles mayor and remained in that office for the next twenty years. In 1982, Bradley ran as the Democratic candidate for the California gubernatorial election against George Deukmejian. Polling conducted in the months leading up to Election Day consistently showed Bradley with a large lead. Exit polls replicated these predictions; some news organizations even predicted he had won on election night. However, it turned out that in this remarkably close election the Republican candidate was ultimately victorious. Although Bradley had lost the race, he found himself the namesake of a polling anomaly, the "Bradley Effect", when voters tell pollsters that they intend to vote for an African-American candidate, but the results on election night indicate they actually voted for the white opponent.

In the 1989 Virginia governor's race, polls showed that Douglas Wilder had a large lead over his Republican opponent, Marshall Coleman. Once again, it turned out that the Bradley Effect had occurred. Even though exit polls predicted a one-sided victory, Wilder, the African-American candidate, won by only .6% (Finkel, Guterbock, & Borg, 1991). In 1990, polls predicted David Dinkins would win by 15% over Rudolph Giuliani in the New York City mayoral race. As in the Wilder race in Virginia, Dinkins barely won much to the surprise of pollsters. In that same year, and again in 1996 the African American candidate Harvey Gantt lost to Jesse Helms in a contest for the North Carolina U.S. Senate seat despite his lead in the pre-election polls. The next major contest pitting an African-American candidate against a white candidate occurred in the 1992 Illinois U.S. Senate race. Carol Moseley Braun was an African-American state legislator who defeated the incumbent, Alan Dixon in the Democratic primary. She then handily defeated her Republican opponent, Richard Williamson. She ran for re-election six years later and was defeated in the general election by Peter Fitzgerald by 4% (Moskowitz & Stroh, 1994).

In each of these contests, the same blueprint emerged. Richard Morin, polling director for the Washington Post, stated, "There's a pattern emerging here…It's as if you could throw all the undecideds to the White candidate (Baxter & Morris, 1989)." The question that is important psychologically, is why would individuals who do not really plan to vote for the African-American candidate,

not honestly tell pollsters of their intentions (Parks & Rachlinski, 2008)? According to Berlinsky (1999), a subset of voters who believe it is socially unacceptable to state they oppose racially sensitive issues. Consequently, instead of saying that they oppose integration, they reply that they do not know if they favor it.

THE 2006 CONTESTS

Prior to 2006 only one African-American, Douglas Wilder of Virginia, had ever been elected as a state Governor. Moreover, since Reconstruction, only three African-Americans have served in the United States Senate. Until 2006, at most, there was only one gubernatorial or U.S. Senate races in any cycle featuring an African-American candidate who had a real chance of winning occurred in any electoral cycle was one. A number of African-Americans had sought office and been elected in House districts, of course. But most of these elections took place in districts where the voters were predominantly people of color.

The 2006 elections changed this scenario. Six different African-Americans had realistic chances of winning the statewide seat for which they ran. One, Kweisi Mfume, lost in a closely contested race for the Democratic nomination of a vacated U.S. Senate seat. The other five ran in the general election and all, at one time or another during their race, were either leading or were close enough to foresee victory. Surprisingly, of the five who ran in the general election, three were Republicans. A roll call of the African-American candidates who ran in the general election follows:

> **Harold Ford** – Ford, an African-American Congressman, faced Bob Corker in the race for the Tennessee Senate seat. Polling was relatively close throughout the contest. The race appeared to turn in the last few weeks following an ad featuring a barely clothed blonde woman asking Ford to give her a call.
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> **Lynn Swann** – A Hall of Fame NFL wide receiver during the 1970's, Swann was the Republican candidate for governor of Pennsylvania. Although a novice to the political arena, because of his high name recognition he was deemed by the Republican establishment as the candidate with the greatest opportunity to defeat Ed Rendell the incumbent governor.
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> **Michael Steele** – Steele was the incumbent Lieutenant Governor of Maryland when he decided to run as the Republican candidate for the United States Senate. When he entered the race, it was unclear which Democrat he would face, Ben Cardin or Kweisi Mfume. After a hard fought primary that went to Cardin, Steele hoped to garner much of the minority vote. However, in a close contest, the Democrat won the Senate seat.

Deval Patrick – Patrick served as the top civil rights attorney in the federal government under President Clinton. He then became a business executive until he decided to run as the Democratic candidate for governor in Massachusetts. Kerry Healey, his Republican opponent, suffered a number of missteps during her run. Combined with the normal Democratic advantage in that state, Patrick won by a wide margin in November.

Kenneth Blackwell – Blackwell was twice elected to Ohio statewide office as a Republican before deciding to run for governor in 2006. He faced Ted Strickland, a Democratic Congressman, in the November election. At least in part, because of Ohio economic travails, and partly because of the role Blackwell played in the 2004 Presidential election for President Bush in the state, Strickland won.

Table 1: 2006 African-American Candidates

Candidate	Polls	Undecided	Election	Difference Share	Percent Difference
Steele (MD)	45	6.3	45	-3.03	-6.72
Ford (TN)	44.3	5.4	48	1.17	2.44
Blackwell (OH)	37.3	6	37	-2.68	-7.25
Swann (PA)	36	6.2	40	1.62	4.05
Patrick (MA)	53.8	16.7	56	-8.59	-15.33

We see in Table 1[1] whether the Bradley Effect played any part in the final results of the 2006 state wide elections which included African American candidates. It is important to keep in mind that it is not necessarily important whether or not a given candidate wins an election to discern if the Bradley Effect occurred. Some elections, although competitive, are unlikely to be won by a candidate in some states, in some years, regardless of race. Witness Lynn Swann's race in a Democratic year, in a Democratic state, against an incumbent Democratic governor. Other candidates will win regardless of a Bradley Effect if the stars align in their favor. Deval Patrick had a 24 point lead going into election day; although the Bradley Effect had a -15.33 effect on Patrick's race, he still won by 12%. In fact, only Deval Patrick won his race; the other four African American candidates lost.

There was indeed a Bradley Effect evinced in some of the 2006 elections. We defined the Bradley Effect for elections which there was 5% or greater differential between the actual vote and pre-election polls. The highest noted difference between the actual vote and pre-election polling was for Deval Patrick. In his case, the difference between the pre-election polls and his actual vote percentage was 15.33%. Blackwell (7.25%) and Steele (6.75%) also found that their results were considerably reduced as a consequence of the Bradley Effect. In fact, in all three of these cases, the African American candidate

received, according to the polls, virtually NONE of the undecided vote. This is a classic Bradley Effect. As stated earlier, normally we would expect the undecided voters to split in the same manner as those who had previously made their candidate selection. However, in each of these elections, the undecided voters all went to the opponent of the African-American candidate.

2008 DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION CONTEST – BARACK OBAMA

In 2004, Barack Obama, then an Illinois state senator, entered the race for the vacated Illinois senate race. While he was handily winning the Democratic nomination, the Republican field devolved into chaos, as the frontrunner was forced to leave following evidence of sexual improprieties revealed by his ex-wife, actress Jeri Ryan. The Democratic Party decided to highlight Obama's campaign by permitting him to present a speech during prime time at the national convention. This speech roused many who heard it, and instantly moved Barack Obama into the forefront of African-American leaders in the nation. Meanwhile, the Republicans eventually chose as their nominee Alan Keyes, an African-American famous for his conservative views, who had run for president earlier in his career. Obama differed from many other recent African-American political leaders. His appeal was not primarily to other individuals of color. Instead, his charisma, intelligence, and youth appealed to many young voters. His early opposition to the Iraq War and the miasma over the American economy brought many individuals who sought change from the nature of American politics over the last 20 or so years of constant bickering over issues that bore little resemblance to the lives of average individuals. Although he had little national political experience, he decided in 2007 to enter the Democratic Presidential nomination contest. As well, Obama was perhaps the first African-American candidate for President for whom race was not THE central theme of his campaign. For the others (Chisholm, Jackson, Sharpton), the issue of racial equality induced many blacks to support them; however, it may well have provoked a number of white voters, who might otherwise have supported them on other themes, to steer away. Obama, though, did not emphasize civil rights, although he did not shy away from the issue when pressured. At first, many observers believed U.S. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton possessed an unshakeable lead for the nomination. She had a number of assets: because of her husband's presidency, she had a connection to many other party leaders; as a U.S. Senator from New York, she had access to many of the media elites and the groups that had historically provided campaign funding; as the first woman to provide a substantial candidate for the presidency, she had a base of other women who were eager to serve in such a groundbreaking campaign. She also had the early support of a large majority of African-Americans, despite Obama's natural racial linkage to them. The only objections to her presidential campaign, at first, was that she had little experience of her own, that she voted for the Iraq War Resolution and because of a series of

incidents during her husband's tenure, there were doubts about her integrity. As the war continued to devolve, though, and as Americans became less confident about the future, Clinton's position as the presumptive leader became more tenuous. To a great extent, because of a large outpouring of new voters, Obama won the Iowa caucus. Then, Clinton reversed the polls, and was victorious in New Hampshire. Her campaign began to unravel in South Carolina. Her husband, who had been regarded as hero among many people of color, attempted to slight Obama's efforts, and the African-American vote slid away from her. As the campaign wore on, she became the candidate of experience and Obama positioned himself as the candidate associated with the idea of change. Since their issue differences were virtually unnoticeable, their images determined the voting blocs associated with them. Obama maintained the support of the well educated, the young, and African-Americans, while Clinton's steadfast enthusiasts were white women, older voters, and Hispanics. The battle continued from winter 2007 until the early summer of the 2008 election year with these two candidates. One had a legacy of nearly twenty years of familial rule of the party. The other, the insurgent, trying to wrest control from the king and queen, had amassed a coalition of well-educated whites and of African-Americans, both of which groups were seeking a new voice to lead the Democratic Party. Following the South Carolina primary, the next significant event in the duel was what became known in the media as 'Super Tuesday', a conglomeration of primaries and caucuses all scheduled for the same day, February 5. It was widely assumed by pundits that whichever candidate amassed the most delegates on this date would likely win the nomination. However, neither candidate took an insurmountable lead on Super Tuesday. Clinton concentrated on large states where she had many long-term allies who would assist her in getting out the vote. Obama, though, sent his staff to small, otherwise neglected states where they usually received the lion's share of the vote. One reason neither side gained much is the Democratic Party's unique method of counting delegates, whereby no states were winner takes all. Another was that each state had great latitude in determining exactly how its delegates were counted. So, some states used systems that benefited Clinton while others used systems that advantaged Obama. So, for example, a state that allocated delegates between Congressional districts equally would tend to benefit Clinton; one that provided extra delegates to districts that had a Democratic representative in Congress would benefit Obama since areas that had a concentration of African-American voters were more likely to have a Democratic member of the House. Once both sides realized that neither had gained an advantage on Super Tuesday, they both began to take stock of their situation. Clinton had run a traditional incumbent-style campaign; she had depended upon a relatively few large contributors and the endorsements of super-delegates to give her an early lead and intimidate any opponents. Obama had run more as an outsider; he relied on the Internet to build enthusiasm among the young and catered the support of individuals who could not afford to provide the maximum legally permissible ($2300) but were willing to send small amounts of money. Neither side had set up

campaigns in states after Super Tuesday either. They employed different strategies at this point as well. Clinton had spent much of her massive funding hoping for a knockout punch on February 5. Obama, since he was dependent on smaller contributors, continued to receive steady donations. As well, since Clinton's funding came from people who understood how politics worked, they were more likely to support her when she was leading than when she was fighting an uphill battle. Obama's individuals were more apt to be first time donors, so they were not reluctant to financially support a candidate, even if he should eventually not be successful. For the next month, Obama won virtually every primary and caucus, most by very large margins. That was what the Democratic Party rules rewarded, large victories. Because of these victories, Obama amassed an unstoppable lead in delegates. After that, until the nomination battle ended in early June, Clinton was defeated, except she refused to concede until the last primaries in Montana and South Dakota.

THE BRADLEY EFFECT – RACIAL CONTEXTS

Many studies have examined the effect of racial factors upon white voters' decision-making. One set of research has looked upon the influence that race-framed issues stimulates whites to vote in a certain manner. These issues range from affirmative action and busing to crime and property taxes. A second avenue analyzes the motivation behind racially tinged voting to determine if people are voting because of their own personal self-interest or in concert with their white cohort. Most studies have determined individual self-interest is much less apt to be the determinant of voting behavior than is group solidarity. Another school contends there is a strand of anti-African-American feelings which drives people's vote choice. This racism is more nuanced than evidenced in the 1950's and 1960's, and is termed 'modern racism' (Citrin, Green, & Sears, 1990). What Citrin, Green and Sears (1990) examined is particularly pertinent to the case of Barack Obama and the 2008 election. Studies have consistently shown that white support for an African-American candidate declines as the percentage of minority voters increases. In line with threat theory, the idea is that, for many whites, their group pressures are exacerbated when the number of African-American voters presents a risk to the hegemony of whites, there is a large drop-off in white support (Liu, 2001).

PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES

Both political parties in the United States employ primaries and caucuses to determine the winner in a given state. Some states use a primary, some use a caucus, and some employ both. The decision is left up to the state legislators,

since a primary obviously costs more to conduct than does a caucus. The function they serve is to select nominees, increase voter enthusiasm, provide publicity and finances to the state party, and drive candidates from the race (Norrander, 1993). Although they have similar functions, there are important differences between caucuses and primaries. While primary voters are similar in a number of respects to those from the party who vote in the general election, caucus voters differ in a number of respects. These participants tend to be more energized, more partisan, and wealthier than typical voters. Candidates also view the contests differently. Since a relatively low percentage of voters are likely to attend caucuses, organizational skills to induce likely proponents to attend their state caucus are important in determining success. Primary triumphs, though, are more apt to be attained by advertising; if enough voters are energized, then a primary win can be accomplished (Norrander, 1989). Obama clearly over performed in caucuses as compared to his primary performances. In the thirteen state caucuses, he received over 60% of the vote in 8 (61.5%) of them. Primaries were much more challenging for him. Out of thirty-six primaries, Obama received over 60% of the vote in only 7 (19.4%). This information fits well with existing theory. As stated earlier, those who vote in caucuses are prone to be more energized than those who choose not to be part of the process. Obama's campaign was dependent on building a level of excitement among advocates through the Internet and through a steady stream of e-mails to supporters. When a contest was imminent in a state, multiple e-mails were sent daily in an attempt to build a level of excitement in their community. As well, volunteers and paid staff called as many Democrats in a state as possible; then, on primary day, those who favored him were repeatedly called to ensure that everything possible had been done to get them to vote.

Table 2: *Relationship between Type of Nomination Contest and Obama Performance*

	Caucus	**Primary**	**Total**
Less Than 40% of the Total Vote	7.7% (n=1)	13.9% (n=5)	12.2% (n=6)
Between 40 -60% of the Total Vote	30.8% (n=4)	66.7% (n=24)	57.1% (n=28)
More Than 60% of the Total Vote	61.5% (n=5)	19.4% (n=7)	30.6% (n=12)

$X^2 = 7.98$ sig < .05

This same strategy was employed in primaries. However, primaries require a minimal level of energy in support of a candidate compared to participation in a caucus. If a person can find less than an hour of free time on Election Day, they are able to fulfill their citizenship activity. A caucus, though, at least this year, took up to six hours to complete, so it is easy to find excuses to

not participate. Therefore, in a primary setting, the organizational and enthusiasm advantages of the Obama campaign were minimized.

Table 3: *Relationship between Type of Nomination Contest and Bradley Effect*

	Caucus	**Primary**	**Total**
Negative Obama Projection > 5%	0	28.0% (n = 7)	24.1% (n = 7)
Obama Projection between -5% and +5%	0	44.0% (n = 11)	37.9% (n = 11)
Positive Obama Projection > 5%	100% (n = 4)	28.0% (n = 7)	37.9% (n = 11)

$X^2 = 7.59$ sig < .05

When we examine whether the Bradley Effect is more likely to exhibit itself in primaries or caucuses, one stark fact is obvious. The 2008 Democratic nomination contest must have been a political pollster's nightmare, if their goal was accuracy. Not only was one of the candidates an enigmatic, charismatic African-American, his primary competitor was one of the most well known women in American political life, whose husband happened to be the last Democratic president. Thus, not only was there a potential Bradley Effect, there was a potential gender effect similar to a Bradley Effect, and whatever effect President Clinton would have on respondents. Yet, of the 29 nominating contests for which there was polling, only 7 found a noticeable under-polling for Barack, all of which were primaries. In an additional 11 contests (4 caucuses and 7 primaries), Obama did better than the pollsters anticipated. So, in the four caucuses for which there was polling, Obama's vote total over-produced in each. Of the 25 primaries that were polled, Obama under-polled in seven and over-polled in seven. We have already discussed our rationale for the caucus errors, the youthful energy of his followers, his team's advantage in organizational skill, and the probable higher social status of his voters. As a further example of the competence in polling during the nomination contest, there was no consistent pattern of errors in primary polling across states.

DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE STATES

Much has been made by the media during the 2008 Democratic nomination campaign of how different demographic factors impact Barack Obama's vote. In this section, an examination will be made of a number of state-level variables. First, the part that each of the factors played in the campaign will be discussed; then bivariate analysis of each will be discussed; finally, a multivariate analysis will be examined.

Table 4: *Bivariate Relationships between State Demographic Factors and Obama Vote(statistical significance in parentheses)*

	Obama Vote	**Bradley Effect**
African-American Population	.169	.156
	(.247)	(.418)
Hispanic Population	-.073	.076
	(.620)	(.690)
Urban Population	.119	.066
	(.415)	(.732)
Elderly Population	-.392	-.340
	(.005)	(.071)
South	-.078	.141
	(.596)	(.464)
	(n = 49)	(n = 29)

For most of the following variables, when examined alone with each of our target variables, Obama vote share and Bradley Effect, the relationship was in the hypothesized direction. However, except in the one case noted below, all of the others were statistically insignificant.

African-American percent of a state's population

At the beginning of the campaign, Hillary Clinton had reasons to believe that she would do well in the African-American community. Her husband had been cited as 'the first Black President.' As well, she had gathered support from a number of black elites in Congress. She also had in her corner in South Carolina an African-American minister (and state senator) whose job was to provide her with support from black churches in the state. At the same time, Obama was being impeded in the African-American community by charges that he was not 'black enough'. Her support from African-Americans began to decline when her aides in New Hampshire started spreading rumors that Obama may have sold drugs. Then a supporter claimed that Obama was a Muslim who went to a madrassah. Finally, in South Carolina, President Clinton made charges that many blacks found to be tinged with racism. Another factor that helped Obama's support among African-Americans was that when he won in Iowa and nearly was victorious in New Hampshire, blacks became convinced that he had a chance to win. Although Obama gets a large share of the African-American vote according to exit polls, it appears to not have, at a bivariate level, any effect upon his vote. Perhaps in states with a high black population, he receives generally less white support than in other states.

Hispanic percent of a state's population

Once again, much was made of the support Clinton had in Hispanic areas

of the nation. It was said that this support could be traced to the Clinton name recognition and her husband's presidency. It was also reported that there was some level of resentment between African-Americans and Hispanics. Thus, there was some likelihood that, in states with a high Hispanic population, Obama's share of the vote would decline. However, it does not seem to matter to either Obama's vote share or any Bradley Effect what percentage of a state's population is Hispanic.

Urbanized population

A hypothesis was derived that Obama's vote share would increase as the percentage of a state's population living in urban areas increases. We posited that individuals who resided within metropolitan areas were more likely to interact with people from other cultures than those who live in rural locales. This would tend to increase Obama's vote in those areas, it was thought. Although slightly positive, there was no recognized relationship for this variable, either.

Elderly population

As populations get older, generally, they were expected to be less receptive to change, especially in the case of an event like the groundswell for Obama. There are a number of reasons for this effect. First, older individuals are more likely to have typical issues with racism than are the young. Second, issues that are more central to the lives of the elderly, Social Security and Medicare, were more central to Clinton's message than to Obama's. Finally, much of the groundswell of enthusiasm for Obama was built on the Internet. It was anticipated that seniors were less likely to be as active in this medium as were younger Democrats. Therefore, as the population of a state grew older, we expected the relationship to be negative. Of each of the demographic variables that we examined in isolation with both of the Obama vote variables, this one was the only one found to have a statistical significance with the Obama vote in the states.

South

Since the 1970's, in the South, much of the white population has voted for the Republican Party. Therefore, what remained as the Democratic core constituency in the Confederacy was the African-American vote. We posited, from this, that Southern states would be more likely to have a positive relationship with the Obama variables.

However, although not significant, it turned out that the relationship was slightly negative. That is, Obama's percentage of the popular vote was slightly less in Southern states than in the rest of the nation.

Table 5: *Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results*

	Un-standardized Coefficient (Std Error)	T-Score
Primary Election	-13.115***	-4.01
	(3.27)	
State African American Population < 5 Percent	0.868	0.27
	(3.26)	
State African American Population > 14 Percent	12.885***	3.26
	(3.96)	
Southern Region	-11.718**	-3.29
	(3.57)	
Percent State Population 65 Years or older	-3.574***	-4.52
	(0.79)	
Percent State Hispanic Population	-0.195	-1.40
	(0.14)	
Post Super Tuesday Election	8.379**	3.04
	(2.75)	
Constant	103.676***	9.25
	(11.20)	

Dependent Variable = Barack Obama % of Vote
Adjusted R-Square = 0.593
N= 49

*** prob < 0.001 level, one tail test
** prob < 0.01 level, one tail test
* prob < 0.05 level, one tail test

AN ANALYSIS OF BARACK OBAMA'SSUPPORT IN THE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS

The preceding sections of this chapter have directly examined the role of the "Bradley Effect" in the 2006 congressional elections and Barack Obama's bid for 2008 Democratic Presidential Nomination. Building on the findngs of these preceding sections, this section aims to provide an analysis of the independent impact of the demographic factors put forward in the preceding chapter on the support Barack Obama received in each of the Democratic Presidential nomination contests. In order to examine Obama's electoral vote support we develop and test an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regresssion model which examines the impact of each of the previously discussed factors on the percent of the vote Barack Obama received in each of the contested elections for the 2008

Democratic Presidential nomination. In addition to the important theoretically variables discussed in our preceding analyses, we include in our OLS Model an additional control variable (Post-Super Tuesday) which is coded 0 for Democratic Nomination contests conducted on or prior to February 5 (Super Tuesday) and 1 for nomination contests held after this date. This control variable is included because of the substantial change in the number of viable candidates remaining in the nomination contest after Super Tuesday. While the names of several candidates remained on the ballot for nomination contests held after February 5, the only two viable candidates remaining on the ballot were Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama.

Figure 1: Scatter Plot of Brack Obama % vs OLS Predicted %



The results of our OLS analyses are reported in Table 5. In general, the results of the analysis are in line with our expectations and the findings reported in our preceding analyses. First, we find Obama did not perform as strongly in primary contests as he did in party caucuses. Specifically, Obama's percent of the vote was approximately 13 percent points greater in caucus contests as compared to primaries, controlling for our other independent variables. Clearly, caucuses which traditionally attract the strongest partisans provided Obama with a significant advantage over his opponents. Similarly, we find states with large African American populations provided Barack Obama with significantly more (12. 89%) support than other states. These findings support the analyses put forth by political pundits and our findings in the proceeding analyses. While caucus states and states with large African American populations provided Obama with greater support, southern states and those with a larger proportion of

senior citizens provided Barack Obama with significantly less support. Specifically, we find Barack Obama's support in southern states was on average 11 percent less than his support in non-southern states, controlling for all other variables. Likewise, we find a 3.57 percent decrease in support for Barack Obama for every 1 percent increase in a state's senior population. Finally, our OLS analysis indicates states with small African American populations and the Hispanic population size of a state did not significantly impact the level of support which Barack Obama received in the 2008 Democratic Presidential nomination contests.

In Figure 1 we present Barack Obama's predicted percent of the vote based on our OLS regression model versus his actual vote in each of the states included in our analysis. As with our preceding analyses, this figure provides us with an opportunity to examine where Barack Obama out performed and or under performed with regard to his expected electoral support. Based on our OLS regressional model, the states of Alaska and Washington should have provided Barak Obama with the strongest support and the states of of Oklahoma and West Virginia should have provided Obama with the least support. While Obama fell nearly nine percentage points under his top predicted vote percent of 83 in Alaska and three percentage points below his predicted vote percent of 71 in the state of Washington, he out performed his low expected vote of 30 percent in Oklahoma by 1 percentage point and under performed by seven percentage points his expecte vote of 33 percent in West Virginia. These results were likely due to his limited campaign efforts in the state of West Virginia and the substantial amount of campaigning which Hillary Clinton conducted in this state. Another interesting issue to observe with regard to these predictions are the states which Obama most over peformed or under performed the model's prediction. Not surprisingly, Obama's greatest under performance was in the two states (Arkansas and New York) which his strongest competitor (Hillary Clinton) has called home. The only surprising state that he under performed significantly was Nevada, which our model suggested he should have won with 59 percent of the vote but actually lost by six percentage points to Hillary Clinton. We argue his under performance in the Nevada primary was likely due to the substantial amount of campaign resources Hillary Clinton committed to this state and candidate Obama's focus on the South Carolina primary which immediately followed the Nevada caucus. Finally, a review of the states which Obama over performed provides a few surprising results. First, he out performed his predicted vote by 18 percentage points in the state of Idaho. This was likely due to this caucus being held on Super Tuesday and Obama's decision to campaign in the small state of Idaho while other candidates ignored this state which only represented 23 delegates. Second, in the southern states of Alabama and Georgia Obama over performed his predicted vote in each state by at least ten percentage points. While he was expected to win in the state of Georgia, his victory in the state of Alabama was not predicted by our OLS model.

In conclusion, the results of our OLS model suggest issues of race and region continue to play a significant role in the Presidential election process. However, our results also indicate that campaign efforts and the unique appeal of each candidate can play a significant if not equally important role in the election process.

NOTES

[1] See Appendix 1 for an explanation of how the Bradley effect was calculated in each race.

APPENDIX 1:

Relationship between Obama's Polling and Vote Percentage (By State Rank)

State	Projected Vote %	Actual Vote %	Difference	Share Differential
CO	32.89	66.6	33.71	50.61
SC	40.68	55.4	14.72	26.57
NV	37.72	45.2	7.48	16.54
IA	31.88	37.5	5.62	14.98
TX (caucus)	49.09	56	6.91	12.34
AL	49.34	56	6.66	11.89
WI	52.43	58.1	5.67	9.75
GA	60.90	66.4	5.50	8.29
VA	59.59	63.7	4.11	6.45
CT	47.52	50.7	3.18	6.27
MO	46.81	49.3	2.49	5.05
IN	47.31	49.3	1.99	4.03
OR	56.49	58.8	2.31	3.92
NC	54.35	56.2	1.85	3.30
NY	40.42	40.3	-.12	-.31
OK	31.34	31.2	-.14	-.46
NJ	45.16	43.9	-1.26	-2.87
PA	46.72	45.4	-1.32	-2.90
MD	62.71	60.7	-2.01	-3.32
TN	41.92	40.5	-1.42	-3.49
TX (primary)	49.09	47.4	-1.69	-3.56
OH	46.19	44	-2.19	-4.97
IL	69.88	64.7	-5.18	-8.01
AZ	46.12	42.4	-3.72	-8.78
CA	47.41	43.2	-4.21	-9.75
KY	33.49	29.9	-3.59	-11.99
MA	46.04	40.8	-5.24	-12.84
WV	29.27	25.7	-3.57	-13.87
NH	41.5	36.4	-5.1	-14.00

APPENDIX 2

How Bradley Effect Was Calculated

1. Obtain Real Clear Politics polling average for each candidate, their opponent(s) and undecided voters.
2. Calculate the predicted score for each candidate. The formula for this was the candidate's polls + (undecided voters*candidate's polls / (candidate's polls + opponent's polls).
3. Obtain the election share for each candidate.
4. Determine the difference between the election share and the predicted score.
5. Calculate the percentage of the candidate's vote that was gained or lost by the Bradley Effect.

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